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Construction projects routinely overrun their cost estimates. A plethora of studies 
have thus been dedicated to investigating the root causes, sizes, distribution and 
nature of overruns. The causes range from a poor understanding of the impact of 
systemicity and complexity projects, unrealistic cost targets and misguided trade-offs 
between project scope, time and cost to suspicions of foul play and even corruption. 
In spite of the vast attention dedicated to the problem of cost overrun, there has been 
limited evidence to support the claim that the size or occurrence of cost overruns is 
reducing in practice. A review of the literature reveals that it may not be an 
exaggeration to claim that the bulk of our current cost overrun research may be 
largely inadequate and deficient to deal with the complexity posed by construction 
projects. This paper provides a critique of current cost overrun research and suggests 
that the adoption of systems thinking is required to better understand the nature of 
cost overruns. We explore some of the embedded methodological weaknesses in the 
approaches adopted in a majority of cost overrun research, particularly the lack of 
systems thinking and demonstrable causality. We reach the following conclusion - 
cost overrun research has largely stagnated in the refinement and advancement of the 
knowledge area. It has largely been superficial and replicative. A significant paradigm 
and methodological shift may be required to address this perennial and complex 
problem faced in construction project delivery. 
Keywords: causality, cost overrun, cost control, project performance, replication, 
research method, systems thinking. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cost estimates prepared in the early stages of a project allow a client to evaluate most 
economical tenders, secure funding or perform a cost-benefit analysis. These estimates 
also often become the basis for cost control during project delivery. Where the project 
is a commercial asset, the initial capital investment to deliver the project must be 
balanced with the cost of maintenance and operations over the life-time of the project 
to ensure it remains profitable and that planned returns on investment are achievable. 
Thus, decisions made during the formative stages of a project carry far-reaching 
economic consequences and can seal the financial fate of a project. Effective cost 
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planning, therefore, relates design of buildings to their cost, so that while taking full 
account of quality, risks, likely scope changes, utility and appearance, the cost of a 
project is planned to be within the economic limit of expenditure. 
Unfortunately, construction projects regularly still make the news headlines, not for 
being remarkable engineering accomplishments that will support and stimulate 
economic growth and social integration of communities, but rather for being poorly 
managed and often over budget. A significant number of construction projects 
routinely overrun their cost estimates. According to the works of Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2002), infrastructure projects are reported to have an 86% probability of outrunning 
their set cost targets. The average size of these overruns can be as high as 45% for rail 
projects, 34% for bridges and 20% for road projects. Love et al (2012) and Odeck 
(2004) on the other hand found that overruns could be as high as 70% and 183% more 
than the initial estimate respectively. The global audit and professional services firm, 
Ernst and Young, reviewed the performance of 365 infrastructure projects delivered in 
the oil and gas industry and found that at least 64% of the projects were faced cost 
overruns to varying degrees. The projects recorded an average cost overrun of 59%, 
representing an incremental cost of US$500 billion in real terms (Ernst and Young 
2014). Merror (2012) also found that up to 78% of oil and gas projects face significant 
cost overruns at an average of 33%.  
Cost overrun has been attributed to several sources including scope creep and rework 
(Love et al. 2005), unrealistic cost targets and misguided trade-offs between project 
scope, time and cost (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2014b), a poor understanding of the 
systemic and dynamic nature of projects (Eden et al. 2005), unidentified or improperly 
managed risk and uncertainty (Okmen and Öztas 2010) to suspicions of foul-play and 
corruption (Wachs 1990). 
A review of the construction management literature, however, reveals that a plethora 
of studies have been dedicated to understanding the problem of cost overruns (Morris 
1990, Flyvbjerg et al. 2004, Odeck 2004, Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith 2013, 2014a, 
Love et al. 2015). Most of these studies usually identify several purported causes of 
overruns and often make recommendations for mitigating and containing the 
phenomenon. However, there seems to be no evidence of alleviating the problem or 
improving the reliability of cost estimates for construction projects. The industry may 
have earned itself the unenviable repute of delivering projects late and over budget, 
again and again, leaving clients dissatisfied and the tax-payer often out of pocket. 
So, why are cost overruns so prevalent in the construction industry irrespective of the 
attention it gets both in academia and practices? Why has there not been much 
improvement in the reliability of initial cost estimates over the years? Surely the 
industry has become a lot better at managing projects. Procurement systems have 
greatly evolved from traditional adversarial design-bid-build to different forms of 
collaborative and relationship contracts. There are more measures now for 
accountability and cost control for project procurement. Information technology for 
construction has also improved significantly with the advent of Computer Aided 
Designs (CAD) and Building Information Modelling (BIM). There are now online 
collaborative platforms for effective communication, design, visualisation, simulation, 
control and coordination of the entire construction process. There appears to be 
growing take-up of digital 3D design and even 4D models that integrate the spatial 
and temporal aspects of a project to understand, predict, evaluate and manage even the 
most complex projects. Most of these IT systems support project cost estimation as 
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well as allow for the use of estimation software and advanced costing methods like 
feature-based estimation, genetic algorithms or fuzzy logic. 
It is against this backdrop, this paper provides a critique of current cost overrun 
research and a nudge towards adoption of systems thinking in dealing with 
construction cost overruns. The paper will explore some of the embedded 
methodological weaknesses in the approaches adopted in a majority of cost overrun 
research, particularly the lack of systems thinking and demonstrable causality as well 
as the over-simplification of the cost overrun problem and replication. The paper 
concludes with some recommendations regarding the future direction of cost overrun 
research and mitigation.   
COST OVERRUN RESEARCH: SIMPLISTIC, SUPERFICIAL 
AND REPLICATIVE 
As already alluded to, there is no shortage of research dedicated to understanding the 
problem of cost overruns or making recommendations on how to alleviate this 
perennial problem in the construction industry. On the whole, this is commendable 
and should be further encouraged. However, there seems to be no evidence of real 
improvements in the reliability of initial cost estimates or the predictability of final 
cost, even with the use of new technologies available to construction experts. A 
critical review of the literature however quickly reveals that it may not be an 
exaggeration to claim that the bulk of our current research may be largely inadequate 
and deficient to deal with the complexity of construction cost overruns. Worryingly, it 
would seem that most studies are rather simplistic and superficial, replicative and not 
been cumulative enough to be effective in addressing the problem. On close scrutiny 
also, there would seem to be stagnation in the rigour and thoroughness of cost overrun 
research.  
Memon et al (2012) undertook an investigation into the 'causes' of cost overrun in 
large construction projects in Malaysia. Using the extant literature, they first identified 
35 different factors that could lead to cost overrun and then required of clients, 
consultants and contractors to rank these factors on a five-point Likert scale from 'not 
significant' to 'extremely significant'. These factors include 'poor project management', 
'lack of coordination between parties', 'mistakes during construction' and 'slow 
information flow between parties'. A relative importance index, defined in equation 1, 
was then used to weight these factors. The strength of correlation between the various 
factors was also measured using the Spearman's rank correlation, ρ, to add some 
statistical rigour to the study. 
                           ∑    
 
 
           ------- Equation 1 
Where 
w = weighting given to each factor by respondents 
x = frequency of response given for each cause  
A = highest weight (i.e. 5 in this case)  
N = total number of participants  
 
Out of the 150 questionnaires distributed, 103 were returned with 97 valid. Fluctuation 
in prices of materials, contractor cashflow problems and client payment delay were 
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the top three 'causes' of overrun. Respondents were also required to recall the 
approximate extent of cost overrun (cost beyond contract sum) for the projects they 
were involved with within the past ten years. A majority (61%) of the respondents 
reported a range of 5% to 10% of contract sum. About 20% recalled overruns beyond 
20% of contract sum.  
This approach to cost overrun research is not untypical at all- Kaming et al (1997), 
Ameh et al. (2010), Mansfield et al. (1994), Jackson (2002), Enshassi et al. (2010), 
Durdyev  et al. (2012), Rosenfeld (2014) and many others have all conducted almost 
identical studies. A careful scrutiny of most of the studies aforementioned, reveal 
some common pathologies in much of cost overrun research: 
1-Lack of systems thinking  
 
This is perhaps the most common shortcoming in the methodological approach 
adopted in cost overrun research. Most studies identify single points in a causal chain 
where an intervention may have reasonably been implemented to change performance 
and prevent an undesirable outcome. This includes past research by some of the 
authors of this current paper (AandB) as well as studies by Odeck (2004), Durdyev et 
al (2012), Flyvbjerg et al (2004) and Mansfield et al. (1994). The identification of 
singular causes, which in most cases only describe the proximal causes, is 
counterproductive, as overrun causation can only be understood by looking at the 
whole project system in which it occurs and how variables dynamically interact with 
one another. Problems very seldom occur as stand-alone issues. Even though they may 
superficially appear to be different, sources of poor performance on construction 
projects are very much interrelated, sometimes in rather complex ways. The crucial 
skill in understanding cost overrun is not the ability to list or rank factors but the 
capacity to see connections and the dynamics between the various sources. Hamilton  
(1997) outlines two important properties of systems thinking that would be useful in 
cost overrun research - every part of a system has properties that it loses when 
separated from the system and every system has some essential properties that none of 
its parts do. Thus, when a system is taken apart, it loses its essential properties (Von 
Bertalanffy 1956). 
Singular cause identification approach is perhaps based on a faulty understanding of 
the nature of construction projects in general. As suggested by Rodrigues and Bowers 
(1996), traditional approaches to investigating project management related problems 
usually assume that if each element of the project can be understood, then the whole 
project may be controlled and delivered effectively. Of course, this approach has yet 
to help project managers deliver their projects on budget and agreed timescales. It is 
important to therefore to adopt a systemic, or causal loop approaches when 
investigating complex problems like cost overruns particularly in large public 
projects. Boateng et al (2013) and Ackermann et al (2007) have both applied this 
systemic approach for identification and modelling risk in project delivery.  
2-Illusion of causality - correlation does not mean causality 
 
A significant number of cost overrun research set out to identify the so-called 'root 
causes' of the problem but invariably only end up scratching the surface of this 
complicated problem. Finding strong correlations between factors does not mean the 
factors are causes of the phenomenon under study. For example, the fact that high 
'graffiti' (Skogan 1990) and 'broken window' neighbourhoods (Wilson and Kellig 
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1982)  correlate rather strongly with high crime levels does not mean that graffiti or 
broken windows cause the crimes. The next example borders on the absurd, but aptly 
sustains the argument being developed. Since 1883, eight Pontiffs have died, five in 
Grand Slam years of the Six Nations rugby tournament. This led to the conclusion that 
“every time Wales win the rugby grand slam, a Pope dies, except for 1978 when 
Wales were really good, and two Popes died” (Payne et al. 2008). [Note: the authors 
of the Pope study did not intend the findings to be taken seriously, but it supports 
point nonetheless. There was no Papal death the last time Wales won in 2008 
anyway].  
Just because two things strongly correlate does not necessarily mean that one causes 
the other. This would seem readily obvious, but can be easily overlooked. A 
correlation provides circumstantial evidence implying a causal link, but the weight of 
the evidence depends greatly on the particular circumstances involved. Ubani et al  
(2013) set out to investigate factors that cause cost and schedule overruns in Nigeria. 
They developed a questionnaire based on “110 hypothetical cost overrun” factors 
identified from the literature. The returned questionnaires from respondents were then 
analysed by measuring relative importance and correlation coefficients. They found 
that material related issues, including price fluctuation and shortages were the main 
causes of overrun. They rejected the hypothesis that contractual relationships, labour 
and design had any significant influence on cost overrun. They then recommended 
that clients, contractors and consultants “should pay more attention to both material 
and external factors for there to be effective and efficient delivery on construction 
projects at the right time and cost.” It is readily obvious the lack of demonstration of 
causation between the factors identified or the superficially of their approach and 
recommendation. The reader is invited to take a closer look at the formulation of the 
following studies to see if causation has been sufficiently demonstrated to warrant 
their paper titles: “Significant factors causing cost overruns in telecommunication 
projects in Nigeria” (Ameh et al. 2010); “Causes of construction cost and time 
overruns: The 2010 FIFA World Cup stadia in South Africa”(Baloyi and Bekker 
2011); “What causes cost overrun in transport infrastructure projects?” (Flyvbjerg et 
al. 2004) and “Causes of delay and cost overruns in Nigerian construction projects” 
(Mansfield et al. 1994).   
3-Ambiguous and Superficial Factors 
 
Poor project management, lack of coordination between parties, mistakes during 
construction and slow information flow between parties are some of the factors used 
in the survey by Memon et al (2012). Others like inadequate control procedures, slow 
decision making, waiting for information or poor documentation used in Frimpong et 
al (2003) are rather too ambiguous. They could be easily be misinterpreted by the 
respondents especially if they are all not thinking within the context of a particular 
project or situation. The reader is invited to pause for a moment here and think 
through the factors “poor project management” and “poor documentation”. It is very 
likely that several interpretations, scenarios or examples came to mind in that exercise. 
This may be a quick indication that such factors are rather too superficial and 
therefore must be broken down further if real sources of overrun are to be identified. 
Questionnaires may be a quick and easy way of sampling the views of respondents but 
can also be problematical if the researcher’s definition of a factor does not correspond 
with the respondent’s understanding.  
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Unless they were perhaps used in a structured case study, for example, it is argued that 
questionnaires alone may not be suitable for investigating complex and systemic 
problems like cost overrun on construction projects. Good project management or 
efficient document management will mean very different things to respondents. The 
factors are simply too high level to help in getting to the heart of the problem itself. 
Interviews allowing the surfacing of deep tacit knowledge and also enabling the 
capture of relationships can provide a much more comprehensive and effective 
representation of the situation. 
4-Cross Perspective  
 
To further complicate matters, respondents are often drawn from different professions 
in the industry. On first thought, this may seem a prudent approach as it helps to 
investigate the problem from different perspectives. However, both Durdyev et al 
(2012) and Memon et al (2012) for example, surveyed clients, consultants and 
contractors without controlling for the different perspectives of these professional. It 
might be agreeable that the perceived sources, sizes or nature of overruns will be 
significantly vary depending on whether the construction profession works for a client 
or the contracting firm, or whether they work in the public or private sector. It 
probably may be best to survey these groups separately than merge all their responses 
into one. This problem of context and cross-perspectives could at least be partially 
addressed by using structured case studies as all respondents would be reviewing the 
same project(s). The findings of this kind of study would usually be more revealing 
than a generic questionnaire without any context or background. 
5-Availability Heuristics  
 
Heuristics are mental shortcuts that help us make decisions and judgments quickly 
without investing a lot of time analysing information. One such heuristic is termed the 
availability heuristic. According to Gilovich et al (2002), availability heuristic is 
employed when someone estimates the frequency or probability of an event based on 
the ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind. Even though 
heuristics can be extremely helpful, they can easily become a hindrance to deep and 
careful thinking. In their seminal work on heuristics, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) 
posit that availability can often be affected by various factors which are completely 
unrelated to the actual frequency or probability of the event under review- how busy 
the respondent is, their interest in the subject under study, level of experience, 
peculiarities of the most salient examples they can recall, their understanding of the 
questions in the survey or the time available to complete a questionnaire. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973) thus warn that if availability is applied to the analysis of an event, 
these factors “will affect the perceived frequency of the classes and the subjective 
probability of events. Consequently, the use of the availability leads to systematic 
biases”.  
Without a carefully designed research and established context of projects being 
evaluated, results of the questionnaires, such as the ones conducted in (Ameh et al. 
2010, Durdyev et al. 2012, Memon et al. 2012) become slightly problematic. It is no 
surprise that the same factors seem to come top of the list most of the time in these 
surveys - poor estimation, poor project management, inadequate risk management, 
unexpected ground conditions, scope changes or material price changes. These are the 
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usual suspects and they come to mind very readily for respondents. It will take more 
thoughtful research design, perhaps research conducted within the context of a 
particular project, to be able to partly circumvent these default responses that have yet 
to help mitigate or contain cost overrun in construction. 
6-Replicative 
 
Finally, replication, the performance of another study to statistically substantiate, or 
challenge, a hypothesis has significant value for research and therefore has been the 
cornerstone of scientific and social studies. It is based on a simple concept: “trust, but 
verify”. Where a replicative study results in different findings, it may indicate that the 
original hypotheses may have been incorrect or only partially correct, and that an 
alternative formulation may be able to reconcile apparent divergent results. 
Replication is therefore essential in helping to establish or disprove causal inferences, 
determination of generalisability of findings and even spur on new research. When 
carried out in a cumulative manner, it helps to build on previous studies and facilitates 
a better understanding of a phenomenon. 
 
For cost overrun research, however, replication has largely been a case of reinventing 
the wheel - doing the same thing over and over. Edge (1995) aptly describes this sort 
of research as “the mass production of a standard product” lacking in “intellectual 
expansion” of the field. However, expansion in depth and detail of cost overrun 
research must take priority of mere quantity and bulk. Albeit with a slight variation in 
context, there has been little methodological advancement in the studies by Mansfield 
et al. (1994), Kaming et al (1997), Jackson (2002), Ameh et al. (2010), Enshassi et al. 
(2010), Memon et al (2012) and Durdyev  et al. (2012). They mostly draw-up a tall 
list of supposed 'causes' of overruns in a questionnaire and require of respondents to 
rank them using their perceived frequency or importance. It comes at little surprise 
that Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) observed in their seminal studies that that the size of 
overruns have not reduced over the 70 years that they studied. They also concluded 
that “no learning that would improve cost estimate accuracy seems to take place.” 
That may well be partly due to the stagnation in rigour and robustness of research 
dedicated to ameliorate the problem. In some ways, we might just be where we always 
were, and always will be if there are no significant paradigm and methodological 
shifts in cost overrun research. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have explored some of the methodological deficiencies in the approaches adopted 
in a majority of cost overrun research. These include a poor understanding of 
systemicity and embeddedness of the sources of overruns, a lack of demonstrable 
causality and superficiality of the research design. We find that cost overrun research 
has largely stagnated in the refinement and advancement of the knowledge area - the 
bulk of it has largely been replicative. We would particularly like to highlight the lack 
of systems or holistic thinking in cost overrun studies, which invariably leads to the 
identification of single points in a causal loop of sources. We argue that this approach 
is a flawed simplification of the cost overrun problem and rather counterproductive. 
Overrun causation can only be understood by looking at the whole project system in 
which it occurs and how several variables dynamically interact with each other. It may 
be important to reiterate here that the crucial skill in understanding cost overrun is not 
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the ability to list or rank factors but the capacity to see connections and the dynamics 
between the various sources. It is suggested that significant paradigm and 
methodological shift may be required to properly understand the nature and sources of 
cost overruns. System dynamics or causal loop mapping, used in combination with 
structured-case studies, may be a better approach to investigating the cost overrun 
problem.  
Finally, it may be worth mentioning that this paper was not meant as an attack on the 
works of respectable colleagues but an attempt to look intently at our collective efforts 
and map-out future directions for cost overrun research that effectively combines 
criticality and robustness. This is particularly important and timely especially against 
the backdrop of overwhelming evidence that cost overrun is as much a problem today 
as it has been decades ago. Besides, what is the benefit of doing the same thing over 
and over again if it is not yielding transformative results anyway?   
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